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Executive summary
This paper considers the likely transaction costs that would be entailed in
exchanging plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under bilateral
agreements. Such transaction costs are hard to estimate, and our estimations
could only be based on experiences in related fields and merely form a best
possible educated guess. However, the actual monetary figures produced in this
study are probably not as valuable as the discussion on how they were generated
and, more importantly, what they imply for a complete comparison of costs and
benefits.
International germplasm flow over the past decades for specific crop groups, and
the number of source countries and destination countries involved, were
estimated. Four different scenarios with a varying degree of germplasm
exchange under bilateral agreements were assumed and likely transaction costs
under these four scenarios were estimated. These scenarios range from an
approach by which all exchange takes place under bilateral arrangements to an
approach by which all germplasm for food, but not for industrial crops, falls under
the Multilateral System of Facilitated Exchange and Benefit Sharing. Only
additional costs, not incurred under the MLS, were taken into account, i.e. costs
for negotiating bilateral agreements, and tracking and monitoring the use of
germplasm under bilateral agreements.
Total annual costs were estimated from $1.2 – 1.9 million for a MLS including
bilateral arrangements covering industrial crops to $ 32 - 128 million for bilateral
arrangements covering all crops. These costs were compared with current annual
investments in the maintenance of Plant Genetic Resorces for Food and
Agriculture (PGRFA) by the private and public sectors and with the estimate of
funds at an annual basis allowing implementation of the Global Plan of Action.
Estimated transaction costs appear quite significant and of the same order of
magnitude as current investments for the scenario with only bilateral agreements.
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21. Background
Until recently farmers and the professional breeding sector have relied on genetic
materials, in the public domain or in the market, being freely available for use in
research and breeding. This is reflected in the current FAO International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, and the
UPOV Convention. UPOV for example, allows the genetic resources in any
protected variety to be exploited for further use, under the “breeders’ exemption”.
As a consequence of the adoption of the CBD, which reaffirmed the sovereign
rights of States over their biological resources, governments are currently
negotiating the revision of the International Undertaking, in harmony with the
CBD, in the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.
The Conference of the Parties to the CBD has recognized (by Decision II/15, in
1995) the special nature of agricultural biodiversity, its distinctive features and
problems needing distinctive solutions, and in this context has supported these
negotiations for the revision of the International Undertaking.
In the framework of the revised International Undertaking, countries are
developing a Multilateral System of Facilitated Access and Benefit-Sharing (MLS)
for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA), on the basis of
countries’ interdependence in regard of such resources, and their importance for
food security. Exchange of crops which are brought into the MLS will not be
dependent on (bilateral) agreements whereas all the other crop germplasm will
probably be exchanged through bilateral agreements. In the framework of the
negotiations on the revision of the International Undertaking governments are
currently discussing a list of crop genepools to which the MLS will apply.
At the same time, many governments are currently considering legislation on
access to biological diversity in general, by way of implementation of the CBD.
The objective of such legislation is to regulate “bioprospecting”, that is foremost
the identification amongst wild resources of bio-active compounds and their
exploitation through the development of pharmaceuticals. This legislation will
most often be of a “bilateralist” nature. Indications are that such legislation may
not take into account the special nature of agricultural biodiversity and the needs
of agriculture, nor may it recognize that most countries are net importers of
PGRFA.
In this context, a high level international Panel of Experts on Access and Benefit-
sharing, which convened in Costa Rica, 4-8 October 1999 within the framework
of the CBD, recognized that “there is a risk that access legislation under
consideration in a number of countries might foreclose or restrict the option of
multilateral approaches that those same countries may be pursuing in
international forums”. Furthermore, the Panel of Experts concluded that “in
developing national legislation on access, Parties [to the CBD] should take into
account and allow for the development of the multilateral system to facilitate
access and benefit-sharing for plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”,
as discussed in the negotiations for the revision of the Undertaking.
3The 1999 FAO Conference also stressed the importance for countries that are
developing relevant legislation “to do so in such a way that would enable them to
take into account and allow for the elements of this (IU; note authors) new
international agreement”.
2. The Likely Effects of Bilateral Arrangements for Access to Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
This paper considers the likely transaction costs that would be entailed in
exchanging plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under bilateral
agreements. To protect the interests of the parties in bilateral agreements
specific regulatory and other conditions have to be fulfilled. Such arrangements
may vary substantially in size, coverage and complexity.
The objective of this study is to enlarge our understanding of transaction costs
involved in the effective functioning of bilateral agreements, including effects on
the access and utilization of PGRFA by various stakeholder groups. To achieve
this objective the following approach has been adopted.
1. First, we estimated germplasm flow over the past decades, in order to obtain
an overview of the size of germplasm exchange for specific crop groups, as
illustrated for specific crops. The databases of SINGER, the Centre for
Genetic Resources the Netherlands (CGN), the Nordic Gene Bank and the
National Institute of Agrobiological Reources (NIAR) of Japan served as data
sources, and limited data of USDA/ARS were added. Taken together, these
data obtained from international and national germplasm holdings probably
give a reasonable impression of germplasm flows between countries for
various crop groups. For the purpose of this study we distinguished cereals,
grain legumes, root and tuber crops, forages, vegetable crops, and industrial
crops. In addition to the extent of germplasm exchange, we investigated the
numbers of source countries and destination countries involved.
2. We then assumed four different scenarios with a varying degree of
germplasm exchange under bilateral agreements according to crop group.
With these scenarios we attempt to envisage the consequences of alternative,
yet fictive outcomes of the debate on the renegotiation of the International
Undertaking. To this end, we have selected discrete options from the
theoretically unlimited continuity of possible outcomes of the debate. These
scenarios were chosen because they surface in these or similar forms in
current discussions in several platforms and because we regarded them as
representative in their conseqences for many more potential variant options.
3. Furthermore, we reasoned that the major elements contributing to additional
transaction costs stemming from the bilateral nature of agreements would
be the following:
· Negotiating agreements;
· Tracking and monitoring the use of germplasm, consisting primarily of
pre-distribution fingerprinting of accessions and post-distribution
monitoring of use by several means.
4These elements would be new elements, and consequently the costs arising
from the introduction of these elements are additional and not just a
redistribution of existing costs.
4. We then combined the conclusions of the third step with the data of the first
two steps, and estimated the total number of agreements for each of the
four scenarios which would be needed to cover the current level of exchange.
5. Subsequently, we estimated a range of values for the transaction costs
identified in step 3 above. In the first place we attempted to approximate the
negotiating costs to come to an agreement. Although costs of arriving at
agreements are known for other issues, it is hard to know how trust or lack of
trust between potential parties in an agreement will influence the costs to
arrive at germplasm exchange agreements. In the second place we
calculated the costs involved in tracking and monitoring the use of
germplasm, including costs incurred at the pre-distribution and post-
distribution stages. As negotiating costs, monitoring costs are hard to
estimate. Our estimations could only be based on experiences in related
fields (IPR) and form a best possible educated guess in translating these
experiences to the issue of bilateral germplasm exchange at hand.
6. In the final step, we added up the three major costs items (negotiating,
fingerprinting and tracking). We then related the costs stemming from bilateral
agreements under each of these four scenarios with figures on public and
private sector investments in agricultural research and development available
to us, including germplasm conservation and improvement. On this basis, we
tried to arrive at a preliminary assessment regarding the extent to which such
costs might be acceptable or feasible for those parties which will have to bear
these additional  costs.
Before proceeding with our first step, it is worthwhile stressing a particular notion
that is relevant to this study. The acceptability of transaction costs  should not
only be judged by comparison with total costs incurred in maintaining PGRFA.
From an economic perspective, a common approach is to compare costs with
benefits. A cost-benefit analysis can be undertaken at various levels including,
among others:
· Individual actor perspectives, such as genebanks, breeding companies,
research organisations, etc., that look at direct consequences for the actor
involved only;
· National level perspectives, that add up the costs and benefits for all actors
within a country and where one would expect a difference between net
provider and net user countries;
· Regional or global perspectives, that add up the costs and benefits for a
number of, or all countries.
Costs and benefits thus vary according to perspective. A benefit from one
perspective might be a cost from another (e.g. benefit-sharing in the form of
financial compensation)6. Whether total expected benefits outweigh costs, or
                                                                
6 Note also that an analysis of costs and benefits of a scenario or situation is always
undertaken with reference to the costs and benefits in an existing or baseline situation.
5vice-versa, can be expected to vary according to the perspective being taken,
and thus to provide the basis for different negotiating positions.
A complete cost-benefit analysis of bilateral arrangements would examine this
balance at the various levels but is outside the scope of this paper. This study
may only provide elements that could fit into such a comparison. The approach
being taken is to study additional costs which are encountered under bilateral
exchange arrangements but not under the MLS.
Figure 1 illustrates how transactions costs from bilateral arrangements would be
incurred by both providers and users of germplasm (distinguished as either
individual actors or at a national level). Any benefits captured by providers would
be essentially a shift from the users’ account to that of the providers: any benefit
to the provider will form a cost to the user. On a global level, there are no
additional benefits, simply increased costs. This figure does not even mention the
“indirect” costs arising from a world of bilateral arrangements in which it can be
expected that far less germplasm exchange will take place. These indirect costs,
in the form of foregone research benefits, are extremely difficult to quantify, but
potentially the most important consequence of a trend towards bilateralization. In
particular, a decrease in information sharing through public databases on the
performance of exchanged germplasm might form the biggest impediment to
future germplasm use.
We do not attempt to weigh up the benefits and costs for even one actor. But we
do, in our discussion of the acceptability of estimated transaction costs below,
begin to relate them to other elements that would enter the “balance sheet”. In
Figure 1 we explain which transaction benefits and costs will be encountered by
providers and users, and how at the global level costs by definition will increase
upon introduction of bilateral agreements. Providers will encounter both benefits
and costs, whereas users will merely encounter costs under effective bilateral
agreements.
Figure 1: Additional Costs and Benefits of Bilateral Arrangements
Providers Users Global
(sum of providers
& users)
Benefits + captured benefits
(=CB)
– CB 0
Costs + transaction costs
providers (TC1)
+ transaction costs
users (TC2)
TC1 + TC2
Net benefits
(benefits – costs)
CB – TC1 – CB – TC2 – TC1 – TC2
3. Germplasm Flow
The first step is an approximate estimation of the current extent of germplasm
exchange. This was undertaken for a number of specific crops that were
regarded as approximate indicators for broader crop groups: cereals, grain
                                                                                                                                                                                         
6legumes, root and tuber crops, forages, vegetable crops, and industrial crops.
The actual dimension (or size) of germplasm exchange can be partly construed
from figures on flows of germplasm available from genebanks. For this study we
have collected a (limited) set of data on germplasm exchange quantities for some
selected representative crops and by some representative collection holders, with
the purpose to formulate some reasonable estimates of the number of
transactions on an annual basis. Figures (see Table 1, end of document) were
calculated from the SINGER database covering the germplasm of selected
IARCs of the CGIAR, as well as from databases from two active European
genebanks, that of the Netherlands (CGN) and the regional Nordic Gene Bank
(NGB), as well as the Japanese genebank NIAR. Some additional data were
obtained from USDA. Separate studies, [one of which is featured as another
micro-paper in this GFAR initiative (Fowler and Smale, 2000)], are examining
these flows in more detail. The figures in Table 1 support estimates of the
number of germplasm accessions distributed by genebanks at approximately
100,000 per year.7
An analysis of user types of germplasm in destination countries shows that for
most crops studied the public domain, consisting of NARS, public genebanks,
and universities, is the largest user category. The share of private sector users of
exchanged germplasm varies by crop, being less than 10% for rice, sorghum,
pearl millet, chick pea, cowpea, groundnut, pigeon pea, and sweet potato, up to
50% and more for vegetables and other germplasm from the European
genebanks. An overview of national genebanks from India, Japan and the USA
(Box 5.4, Ten Kate and Laird) mentions averages of 33%, 4% and 11%
respectively as figures for use by the commercial sector. Table 7.1 of the FAO
State of the World (1996) mentions commercial use figures for the CGIAR
genebanks ranging from 0% for Phaseolus collections of CIAT and total
collections of ICARDA and IITA, to 6% for CIAT forage legumes collections, 7%
for ICRISAT collections and 8% for the CIMMYT maize collection.
As can be seen in Table 1, OECD countries received less than 15% of the total
samples of IARC-distributed accessions, for crops such as rice, sorghum, pearl
millet, chickpea, groundnut, pigeon pea and sweet potato, whereas these
countries received more than 50% of the samples distributed for vegetables and
the other crops of CGN. 8
In general, the public sector and non-OECD countries are the largest
beneficiaries of the samples originating from the CGIAR genebanks, whereas the
regional role and the larger share of the private sector in total breeding efforts is
exemplified in the case of the European genebank collections by the higher share
of private sector and OECD destination countries. Even for these European
                                                                
7 The difference between this estimate and those used elsewhere (IPGRI, Issues in Genetic
Resources No. 5) are largely due to the focus here on exchange of genebank germplasm
and the omission of the distribution of improved breeding materials in Table 1. As we
proceed with an analysis based on the number of sources and destinations, and thus the
number of agreements necessary, the number of accessions exchanged becomes less
important than the number of actors involved. In our view, it is likely that the number of
actors involved in exchange of genebank accessions will be a reasonable approximation of
the number of actors involved in total global exchange of plant germplasm.
8 Figures were not characterized for user geography for accessions distributed by NIAR,
Japan.
7genebanks, a considerable portion of total exchange is towards non-OECD
countries.
Although breeding products in the North continue to be developed from genetic
resources obtained from the South, South-South transfers remain significant
among developing countries as do exchanges between industrialised countries.9
Over the years, many countries in the South have built extensive capacity to
innovate and add value to some of their genetic resources. More and more, the
“grand bargain” is between different actors in civil society, rather than between
states (Ten Kate and Laird, 1999).
The analysis above is used in estimating the number of agreements and the
various actors involved, but we turn first to formulating a number of likely
scenarios concerning the extent to which exchanges could take place under a set
of bilateral agreements on exchange.
4. Scenarios involving Bilateral Approaches towards Exchange
Recent negotiations on the revision of the International Undertaking have
concentrated to a certain extent on the possible list of crop genepools that could
fall under the Multilateral System of Facilitated Access and Benefit-Sharing
(MLS). The two “extreme” options are that, in one case, all germplasm for food
and agriculture falls under the MLS and, in the other, that all exchange takes
place under bilateral arrangements. In between these two extremes  there is a
range of options. For our study, we formulated four scenarios as detailed in Table
2. These scenarios were chosen because they surface in current discussions in
several fora and because they examplify the consequences of choices for a
larger or more limited list of crop genepools.
Table 2: Scenarios of crop coverage for the multilateral system (MLS)
A B C D
Crops
covered
None
(all exchanges
under bilateral
agreements)
Included*
CGIAR
collections &
national
cereals
collections
Included
CGIAR
collections &
national
cereal and
grain legume
collections
All included
food crop
collections
(only non-food
crops under
bilateral
agreements)
*By included is indicated that not all germplasm under given jurisdiction will automatically qualify
for coverage under the MLS, depending on legal status (public or private) and utility (conservation
collections vs. breeding or research collections)
5. Additional Transaction Costs under Bilateral Exchanges
Our third step was to examine the transaction points that are specific for bilateral
exchange agreements. A number of costs are incurred in the exchange of
PGRFA. Costs incurred by suppliers of PGRFA for collecting, characterising,
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8evaluating and distributing genetic resources are quite considerable. However,
such costs are part of what might be termed the “production process” of
exploiting genetic resources, and - although considerable and a heavy burden for
collection managers - they are costs that have to be covered under either
multilateral or bilateral agreements of exchange. Thus they are not included in
this study.
Transaction costs involved in bilateral exchange are likely to begin when those
seeking genetic resources engage in acquiring information about possible
sources of desirable germplasm accessions.
The most significant transaction costs begin when suppliers and demanders
come together to negotiate an exchange of germplasm. Both actors incur costs in
the process of arriving at an agreement on a range of aspects, including the
scope of use, financial compensation, and obligations of the parties to the
agreement. These are direct and very tangible, financial costs (e.g. time of staff
involved, legal fees, etc.) borne by the demanders and suppliers, and recurring
for each agreement.
Further transaction costs are associated with monitoring the agreed use of the
material under contractual arrangements. Some of these transaction costs may
be borne by the demander in the form of reporting requirements. But based on
current experience, the more significant transaction costs are likely to be incurred
by the supplier in the form of monitoring the use and ensuring that the exchange
agreement has not been transgressed. Additional transaction costs would be
incurred when enforcement actions are undertaken in the case of a suspected
failure to abide by the terms of a contract, culminating possibly in private legal
action.
For our analysis, we have distinguished  three different types of transaction costs:
· Negotiation costs of agreements
· Pre-distribution tracking costs (fingerprinting of accessions)
· Post-distribution tracking costs (monitoring of use, molecular analysis)
If bilateral exchange of germplasm would become the predominant mechanism, it
is unlikely that bilateral agreements would be concluded per exchange
transaction. We have assumed that the transaction costs implicated by
agreements concluded on a per-exchange basis would be too high to be
worthwhile, providing a rationale for exchangers to conclude broader agreements
on a per crop basis, or even more broadly.
Our next step focuses on estimating the number of agreements that are needed.
Admittedly, the assumption that broader agreements would prevail has resulted
in rather conservative estimates of the transaction costs involved in bilateral
arrangements.
6. Number of bilateral agreements
The number of agreements needed rather than the number of exchanged
samples seemed to us the more realistic parameter to estimate negotiating costs.
9In the fourth step we have therefore estimated the total number of agreements for
each of the four scenarios which would be needed to cover the current level of
exchange under bilateral arrangements.10 It has been assumed that such
agreements would, on average, last five years. The results of this step have to be
interpreted with great care, since assumptions on the investments in negotiating
could not be underpinned with hard data.
The total number of agreements estimated to be necessary under each of the
four scenarios identified above is presented in Table 3 and explained below.
Our estimates of the number of agreements are based on the following figures
regarding annual exchange of germplasm. Total transfer may amount up to
800,000. International transfer through the CG system has been estimated at
650,000 for food crops, consisting of 500,000 samples of improved germplasm
and 150,000 from the in-trust collections (IPGRI, 1996). We estimated non-CG
transfer of food crops at 150,000, based on our own information and limited
figures from Ten Kate (1999) and at 50,000 for non-food crops [Lesser, pers.
comm.]). The estimate of 150,000 seems  reasonable based on a comparison of
the holdings of CGN, NGB and NIAR with their germplasm exchange levels; total
holdings of these three genebanks of 260,000 accessions compare to an average
yearly exchange of 8,000 accessions approximately, whereas total global
holdings in national genebanks amount to 5,5 million, and would translate in
170,000 based on the exchange figures for the three genebanks mentioned.
Figures of Ten Kate (box 5.4; 1999) show that only four large genebanks already
distribute 60,000 accessions annually to foreign destinations.
Table 3: Agreements (per year) estimated to be involved under various scenarios
of bilateral/multilateral exchange
Scenario A
Bilateral
agreements
only; no MLS
B
Limited MLS
including CGIAR
collections and
major cereal
crops
C
Larger MLS
including CGIAR
collections,
major cereal and
grain legume
crops
D
Bilateral agreements
on non-food crops
only
Agreements per
year
400 – 2,000 200 – 500 80 – 200 20 – 40
Accessions
exchanged
under bilateral
arrangements
800,000 150,000 100,000 50,000
Accessions to
be fingerprinted
per year1
48,000 9,000 6,000 3,000
1. See “Fingerprinting germplasm for exchange” further on in text for detailed description of calculation
Scenario A: It is expected that in the absence of the MLS, agreements would be
of a multi-crop nature and cover a larger number of transactions between any two
parties, in an effort to reduce transaction costs. Table 1 shows that the maximum
number of source countries and of destination countries for the germplasm flows
of crops included there is approximately 100. Although these numbers seem
                                                                
10 We have restricted ourselves to bilateral arrangements at this point and have not addressed
the likely scenario that regional and sub-regional agreements would probably emerge if a
multilateral system would not materialise.
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quite high, one should take into account that, in addition to, or instead of states,
private parties would become involved in bilateral exchange agreements.
Therefore, 100 providers and 100 demanders seem to be  reasonable, upper limit
figures.11 This would result in a maximum of 100 times 100, or 10,000
agreements in total.
However, the available figures on current exchange patterns may not form a
precise reflection of the numbers of actors actually involved. For example, the
number of source countries in Table 1 corresponds to sources of all accessions
in collections. Not all of those have been distributed to destination countries.
Furthermore, the number of destination countries over the last two decades may
not correctly indicate which users are still current demanders.
The following assumptions were therefore made, to arrive at a lower estimate.
Based on the figures in Table 1, we reasoned that per crop group (cereals, grain
legumes, etc.) there would be at least 25 Northern countries or companies and
15 Southern countries that want to access germplasm, searching for specified
valuable traits rather than for coverage of crop genetic diversity in general. This
amounts to 40 demanders. Furthermore, by taking into account the limited
number of countries that have been the source of most of the genebank
accessions and the directed search expected under bilateral arrangements, we
estimated that there would be at least 10 source countries or providers per crop
group. This would add up to 400 agreements per crop group (40 times 10).
However, given the fact that many different crops are involved, we assumed a
five-fold more complex situation (agreements might be negotiated per crop group;
different countries will be involved depending on the crop group), leading to
approximately 2000 agreements as a lower estimate. Recalling that we have
assumed that agreements will last, on average, five years, the lower and higher
estimates would then correspond to a range of 400 – 2,000 agreements on a
yearly basis.
Scenario B: If all included CGIAR collections and the included national
collections in the major cereals rice, wheat, maize, sorghum and barley were
included in the MLS, the germplasm exchange to be covered by bilateral
agreements would reduce dramatically. However, on the basis of current
exchange patterns, the number of source and destination countries for bilateral
exchange would decrease much less, since many countries would still seek
access for the crops not covered. Agreements might become less complex.
We assumed that half of all countries involved in scenario A lack sufficient
breeding capacity and solely depend on the CGIAR institutes for advanced
materials in the major staple crops. The number of destination countries would
decrease to 50. Similarly, the number of source countries would reduce, since not
all countries providing cereal germplasm would also act as a source for other
crop groups. We also took into account that bilateral agreements would be
needed for fewer crop groups. On this basis we estimated the total number of
parties involved in bilateral transactions to be a maximum of 502 or 2500. The
lower estimate (1,000) would assume that only half as many germplasm
demanding parties might be involved as under scenario A, other assumptions
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would be entailed if bilateral arrangements were replicating the existing pattern and scale of
transfers.
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being unchanged including the number of source countries per crop group and
the average five crop groups being distinguished in negotiations. On a yearly
basis, these estimates would account for an average range of 200 – 500 bilateral
agreements.
Scenario C: Under this scenario, even more countries would rely entirely on the
MLS, covering all included cereal and grain legume collections. Our estimations
assumed that any single agreement between two parties would cover all crops
not under the MLS. We reasoned that 40 destination countries, harbouring
substantial breeding capacities, as under scenario A, would now negotiate with
25 donor countries, representing the major centres of diversity for all remaining
crops. This would result in a higher estimate of 1,000 agreements over a five-
year period. A lower estimate of 400 agreements is based on the assumption that
only 15 destination countries would negotiate with 25 donor countries. On a
yearly basis, these estimates correspond to an average range of 80 – 200
agreements.
Scenario D: Under this scenario, all food crops would be covered by the MLS.
To enable the exchange of industrial crop germplasm, 10 - 20 Northern countries
or private parties and 10 Southern countries would each seek access to 5 source
countries, mainly estate and fibre crops such as cacao, coffee, cotton, hemp,
jute, oil palm, rubber, and tea. In many cases, agreements will now cover a single
crop only. Thus the range of agreements is 100 – 200 which corresponds to 20 –
40 on a yearly basis.
It will be clear from the estimates above that not only the number of agreements
but also the complexity of such agreements will decrease under increasing
coverage of the MLS. Furthermore, our estimates of the number of agreements, a
key parameter of our analysis, show a decreasing range with increasing
coverage of the MLS. In other words, our level of uncertainty concerning the
number of agreements is greater, the more crops fall under a bilateral approach.
Obviously, all of these estimates are speculative. We felt that they are a
reasonably educated guess as to how many agreements would be necessary to
cover the patterns of exchange that are currently taking place. Here we want to
stress two major uncertainties. The first is that negotiating parties will be able to
cover entire crop groups (scenarios A and B) or even all remaining crops
(scenario C) under a single agreement. If this would be unrealistic, as many
argue, the total number of agreements would increase substantially. The second
essential assumption is that existing patterns of exchanges would not change
substantially. However, presently we cannot predict that all these agreements
would really come into being. In our concluding section, we briefly revisit the
expected effects of estimated transaction costs on the number and pattern of
agreements.
7. Costs of Negotiating Agreements
The costs of negotiating agreements consist essentially of personnel time on the
part of both the provider and the recipient of PGRFA. Relatively senior, or
qualified, personnel are required to negotiate and conclude exchange
12
agreements. Whether internal or external expertise is used does not really affect
the analysis undertaken.
Given the almost speculative nature of these calculations, we worked with a
simple average cost per negotiated agreement. We assume that each side is
required to invest, on average, 10 person-days into the negotiation and
concluding of a single agreement costed at $500 per day. Thus the total,
including both parties, is $10,000 per agreement. For anything more complicated
than a standardized, “take-it-or-leave-it” agreement, this seems to us to be a
minimum time necessary.
This is considerably more than the range of $100 (for a relatively simple material
transfer agreement) to $1,000 (for complex agreements) used in IPGRI’s
previous study (IPGRI 1996). But that study was based essentially on a cost-per-
exchanged-accession basis.
In this study it is assumed that agreements between individual sources and users
of PGRFA will cover a number of years (average of five years) and a number of
accessions per crop or even crop groups. It is expected that this approach would
offer efficiencies for the parties involved, in terms of transaction costs, by limiting
the number of agreements, albeit more sophisticated and broader, that would be
negotiated.
There are reasons for supposing that, in some cases, such agreements would be
far simpler, such as those that might be concluded between two publicly
managed genebanks. But in other cases, for example where the recipient is a
breeding company, negotiations might become more complex. In these and other
cases, for a number of providers of PGRFA such negotiations would serve to
define the precise terms of benefit-sharing of genetic resources, and to extract
terms that are as beneficial as possible. Furthermore, for a number of providers
of PGRFA, a variety of public authorities may be involved, directly or indirectly, in
such negotiations. These factors would all rapidly raise the amount of personnel
time involved. Ten days per side might therefore be quite an underestimate.
There is good reason to suspect that these costs might decline after an initial
period of five-to-ten years. An initial round of more intense negotiating and
tracking of agreements would probably be necessary for the parties to develop a
better sense of what the limits of negotiations are. A sense of trust would also
develop among certain actors. In this sense, the estimate of $10,000 per
agreement is seen as an underestimate for an initial period, but a possible
overestimate in the longer term.
Table 4 presents the results when the estimate of $10,000 per agreement is
multiplied with the estimated numbers of agreements from Table 3. Estimated
negotiation costs range from $0.2-0.4 million under an MLS with bilateral
arrangements limited to industrial crops to $4-20 million under a fully bilateral
approach. This latter range is somewhat less than that first suggested by IPGRI
(1996), reflecting the point above about the efficiencies of fewer but more
encompassing agreements.
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Table 4: Transaction costs under various scenarios of bilateral exchange
agreements (costs in million US$ and on an annual basis)
Scenario A B C D
Negotiation costs 4 – 20 2 – 5 0.8 – 2 0.2 – 0.4
Pre-distribution tracking costs 7.7 1.4 1.0 0.5
Post-distribution tracking costs 10 - 50 5 – 12.5 2 - 5 0.5 – 1.0
Total Transaction Costs (TC) 22 - 78 8 – 19 3.8 – 8 1.2 – 1.9
Total TC as % of private breeders
expenditures on maintaining genetic
resources1
44 – 156 16 – 38 7.6 – 16 2.4 – 3.8
Total TC as % of public
expenditures on PGRFA
maintenance2
29 – 101 24 – 56 18 – 38 14 – 23
Total TC as % of estimated
implementation costs of the GPA3
7 - 26 2.7 – 6.3 1.3 – 3.7 0.4 – 0.6
1. Source: ASSINSEL Web site, estimated at $50 million (see text)
2. Calculated using an average annual maintenance cost per accession (see text)
3. Estimate of $300 million
8. Pre-distribution Costs: Fingerprinting germplasm for exchange
It is assumed that suppliers of PGRFA will incur costs to be able to monitor the
use of exchanged material to ensure, in particular, that any benefit-sharing
provisions of contracts are not violated. In order to allow monitoring of use of
exchanged germplasm, fingerprinting of accessions will be required. Current
technology is able to identify original materials exchanged under an agreement.
However, at this very moment, it is not yet possible to demonstrate the presence
of small amounts of genetic information derived from germplasm exchanged
under a bilateral arrangement with benefit-sharing provisions and representing
valuable traits in a dissimilar genetic background.  Options to follow the use of
exchanged germplasm in breeding programmes and its representation in
released varieties are still insufficient. However, appropriate technology which
would allow to closely follow the use of germplasm is developing fast. In this
regard, the increasing availability of microsatellite sequences for many crops,
increasing knowledge of expressed genes and their alleles, and the development
of high-throughput technology such as DNA micro-arrays are relevant.
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Therefore, for this study we have assumed that technology will soon allow the
provision of information necessary to verify, for example, whether released
varieties contain in their parental lineage, materials covered under bilateral
arrangements. To allow a financial estimation, it is also assumed that in the near
future costs to cover such an analysis, would approximate costs currently
incurred for fingerprinting exchanged germplasm.
The extent of fingerprinting taking place is assumed to vary according to how
many crops, and thus accessions, fall under a MLS and how many are covered
by bilateral agreements. The number of accessions estimated to be fingerprinted
under the various scenarios is also presented in Table 3, calculated as follows.
We assume that the number of accessions under totally bilateral arrangements
(scenario A) would be approximately 800,000. We have also assumed that total
time needed to fingerprint all exchanged materials would be five years. In
addition, identical materials might be handed out several times; redundancy in
distribution is estimated at a factor of 3. This would mean that the number of
accessions to fingerprint per year would be 48,000 accessions ( = 800,000
accessions X 0.2 X 0.3).12 In the case of scenario B, the total number of
accessions under a bilateral approach would be approximately 150,000 (100,000
food crop and 50,000 industrial crop accessions) giving the number of accessions
to fingerprint per year at 9,000. Under scenario C, the number of accessions
would decline to 100,000 (50,000 food crop and 50,000 industrial crop
accessions) leading to 6,000 accessions to fingerprint per year. Lastly, under
scenario D only 50,000 industrial crop accessions would be covered under a
bilateral approach, leading to 3,000 accession to fingerprint per year.
Fingerprinting can be regarded as an up-front cost and may be expected to
decrease slowly over time as more and more accessions in collections are
fingerprinted. On the other hand, as breeding materials constitute the majority of
exchanged samples, this cost may decrease only slightly, and maybe more
important, as technological options increase repeated investments to improve
tracking of materials will be needed. We have assumed that the pre-distribution
costs will continue to be necessary.
Table 3 presents the estimated number of accessions that would have to be
fingerprinted under the various scenarios for bilateral exchange arrangements.
Here, it is assumed that for self-pollinated species the number of plants to be
fingerprinted would be approximately 5 per accession, and in the case of cross-
pollinated species, approximately 20. We also assume that the proportion of
cross-fertilising species of total exchanged germplasm would be approximately
20%. The average number of plants to be tested per accession would then be 8
[(80% x 5) + (20% x 20)]. The current costs of fingerprinting a single plant using
existing technology is estimated at $20 based on CGN’s experience. Thus, the
average cost of fingerprinting an accession is $160 (= 8 x $20).
Table 4 presents, in the second row, the results of multiplying the $160 per
accession costs by the estimated number of accessions to be fingerprinted per
                                                                
12 0.2 represents the spreading of fingerprinting per accession over five years while 0.3 is the
factor of 3 for redundancy.
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year presented in Table 3 (e.g. under scenario A 48,000 accessions x $160
makes $7,68 million). Here we have included both genebank accessions as well
as improved materials distributed by the CGIAR centers, since the technological
limitations would not allow fingerprinting of the constituting genebank germplasm
only. Thus the costs of fingerprinting are estimated as ranging from $0.5 million
per year under a MLS with bilateral arrangements covering industrial crops
(scenario D) to $7.7 million per year under a fully bilateral approach (scenario A).
Since these figures represent costs for current technology, these figures should
be regarded as an approximation.
9. Costs of Tracking Germplasm and Monitoring its Utilization
Tracking the use of germplasm by recipients and ensuring that agreements are
not violated is an essential activity that would have to be undertaken under a
bilateral approach, in order to monitor the compliance with the agreements. There
is little sense in negotiating agreements with benefit-sharing provisions, in order
to ensure that providers of PGRFA receive a “greater share” of the benefits, if
these providers do not invest resources in ensuring that the recipients respect
these agreements. This is particularly the case given the ease with which the
lineage of newly registered varieties might be disguised, or not fully admitted.
The costs of tracking germplasm and monitoring its utilization consist essentially
of monitoring and tracking the registration of plant varieties and of patents
covering crop plant genes, including regulatory sequences, in attempting to verify
varietal parentage. In exceptional cases, legal action may then be undertaken if
misuse is suspected, even if financial costs are high and chances to deliver
acceptable proof for misuse are limited. Alternatively, publicity might be sought to
challenge suspected or identified misuse, or the FAO Commission might play a
role here as a global governance body.
There are thus choices about whether and how to progress to the next stage.
Furthermore, monitoring activities may only be undertaken on a regular,
undisclosed basis (either by the provider or by third parties) that is meant to
provide enough of a disincentive to any single recipient that their use of the
germplasm might be subject to scrutiny. One can expect that there will be some
economies of scale as the number of agreements increases. For example, if the
same material is provided to a breeder in a country in which another breeder has
also received the same material, then the additional costs of tracking this second
agreement may be much lower than for the first one.
We have estimated post-distribution tracking costs on a per-agreement basis. We
have assumed above that agreements last, on average, five years and Table 3
shows the number of agreements to be concluded per year. But the five-year
duration covers actual exchanges while obligations will typically last beyond this
period. Thus post-distribution monitoring will last much longer than the five-year
period. Following our reasoning, there would be a build-up in the initial five years
of the amount of post-distribution tracking taking place.
For simplicity, we estimate the longer-term average of post-distribution tracking
taking place as being based on the number of agreements in existence. These
were estimated above and are 5 times the annual number of agreements listed in
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Table 3 according to each scenario. We estimate these costs at 10 person-days
per agreement per year. For some clonally propagated crop groups investments
in following up adherence to PBR and patent regulations by germplasm users
equals investments in research and development and varieties (estimated at US$
1 billion), whereas in other crops groups characterized by hybrid varieties, such
follow ups are not necessary because of the nature of the product. Our figure at 2
– 10% of these R&D investments seems reasonable. This figure takes into
account the considerable number of samples covered per crop or crop-group
agreement (800,000), the high number of yearly released varieties (presently the
total number of varieties protected under plant breeders rights according to
UPOV amounts to more than 230,000!), and the growing number of patents
which include plant germplasm. It also takes into account for a small number of
labour-intensive physical tracking cases, sampling and molecular analysis of
plants. As can be seen in Table 4, this results in estimates of total post-
distribution tracking costs ranging from $0.5 – 1.0 million under a bilateral
approach covering only industrial crops (scenario D) to $10 – 50 million under a
fully bilateral approach (scenario A). These estimates may seem high but we
highlight that we have not included the costs of any legal action against or
alternative actions concerning suspected transgressors (reconvening agreement
parties, publicity efforts) which while very infrequent will  be very expensive.
10. Total Transaction Costs
The total transaction costs for each scenario are presented in Table 4. These
totals range from $1.2 – 1.9 million for a MLS including bilateral arrangements
covering industrial crops to $ 22 - 128 million for bilateral arrangements covering
all crops. There is a difference of more than one order of magnitude between
these two extremes, correlating to the number of individual germplasm
exchanges involved. Here we note again that the range from lower to higher
estimated transaction costs increases in relative terms as the number of crops
falling under bilateral agreements expands.
To evaluate what these rather conservatively estimated transaction costs imply,
we have to compare these figures with current investments in the maintenance of
PGRFA. Such comparison allows us to draw some tentative conclusions about
how many bilateral arrangements might actually materialise. In Table 4, we have
compared the estimated transaction costs under the various scenarios with the
estimated expenditures by private sector breeders on the maintenance of
germplasm. These costs are taken from ASSINSEL's Web site, which reports the
results of a survey of its members. From this information, which was reconfirmed
by an Assinsel representative as realistic, it can be concluded that research and
development expenditures of private sector breeders world-wide amount to
approximately $1 billion per year and that the portion of this sum allocated to
germplasm maintenance is 5%, or approximately $50 million. The range of
transaction costs estimated per scenario ranges from 2 - 4 % of these
maintenance costs under the most comprehensive multilateral scenario (D) to a
level exceeding total current private investment in germplasm maintenance for a
fully bilateral approach (scenario A), transaction costs being estimated at 44 –
156 % of these maintenance costs.
From our analysis of germplasm flows it appeared that the public sector is the
biggest user of germplasm from genebanks. Moreover, the public sector is the
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largest investor in maintaining germplasm collections. We, therefore, compared
our estimated transaction costs with a rough estimate of public sector
expenditures on maintaining genebank collections, as it is out of these budgets
that such costs would most likely have to be paid in the first instance. Referring to
Burstin et al. (1997), we estimated the average annual maintenance costs as $14
per accession.13 We applied this cost to estimated numbers of accessions
coming under the scope of bilateral arrangements in each of our four scenarios.14
Compared against these numbers, our conservatively estimated transaction costs
appear quite significant, ranging from 29 – 101 % of total public investments
under scenario A to 14 – 23 % under scenario D. In this respect it should be
noted that public budgets for maintenance of PGRFA have been continuously
under threat, rendering additional costs a great burden for the public sector and a
further threat to the security of germplasm collections.
Assessing whether these costs under any of the scenarios presented might be
acceptable for the actors involved is a difficult task. A complete cost-benefit
analysis of bilateral arrangements is not within the scope of this paper, as
mentioned in the introduction.
The objective of bilateral arrangements, for the germplasm provider, is to capture
as much as possible the benefits from the distributed germplasm. Currently it is
assumed that predominantly western countries and in particular private breeders
capture these benefits. Consequently, one should ask the question what interest
public sector users will have in paying such transaction  costs and if they will not
be inclined to avoid such expenses. Their reluctance to do so may be
exacerbated by the financial pressures under which public sector agricultural
research institutions are increasingly finding themselves.
A final point of consideration is the estimate of $150 – 450 million required to
implement the Global Plan of Action (GPA). For the purpose of our estimates we
have set these invesments at $300 million annually. A direct comparison of the
estimated transaction costs with the estimated cost of the GPA can be
misleading. The GPA includes priority activities for PGRFA conservation and
sustainable use, to ensure the conservation of germplasm for the use of future
generations, and the unpredictable needs of farmers and plant breeders. Thus,
our estimated transaction costs of bilateral arrangements are in no way a
substitute for the much broader purposes of the GPA. But the fact that these new
and additional public funds have not yet been forthcoming reinforces our
scepticism about the acceptability of our estimated additional transaction costs,
particularly for public sector stakeholders.
                                                                
13 This is based on estimates of $7 for autogamous sexually-regenerated accessions and $43 for
vegetatively-propagated accession. We assume that the former comprise roughly 80% of
accessions and the latter, 20%. This leads to an estimate of $14 which is somewhat less, but quite
comparable, to estimates reported by Virchow (1999).
14 For a completely bilateral world (scenario A), this is the total 5.5 million accessions currently
held. Using data of FAO’s State of the World (WIEWS database), the estimate for scenario B is
estimated at half of the total (cereals now under the MLS) less the CGIAR-held accessions of 0.6
million, giving an estimate of 2.4 million. For scenario C, we remove a further 0.9 million,
corresponding to 16% grain legumes accessions of the total 5.5 million, to arrive at 1.5 million.
Scenario D is estimated as covering 10% of the total, leading to roughly 0.6 million.
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11. Conclusions
Any study of expected transaction costs under hypothetical scenarios of future
developments in institutional arrangements is fraught with difficulties and
uncertainties. Indeed, the actual monetary figures produced in such a study are
probably not as valuable as the discussion surrounding them as to how they were
generated and, more importantly, what they imply for a complete comparison of
costs and benefits.
In this spirit, on the basis of our preliminary analysis we conclude that the
analysis of transaction costs indicates that a scenario in which all germplasm
exchange falls under bilateral agreements entails excessively high transaction
costs. These costs would probably drop to more acceptable levels if major food
crops were covered by a MLS. The addition or removal of certain crop groups is
likely to have a great effect on the transaction costs associated with bilateral
exchanges.
Our analysis above has focussed on germplasm exchange patterns and
accompanying costs in relation to global investments in the germplasm
management for such crops. Whether bilateral exchanges that cover only minor
food crops would result in acceptable transaction costs, is still another issue.
Minor food crops require generally much more limited germplasm exchange,
allowing for less complex negotiating and lower transaction costs under bilateral
arrangements. However, these crops also represent a very small component of
the commercial seed market if any at all, although they are often of great local
and regional importance to food security and culture, justifying germplasm
exchange for crop improvement.
We therefore expect that the transaction cost estimates for a scenario with minor
food crops covered by bilateral exchanges would be even less acceptable.
Taken together, these considerations push us even more towards the conclusion
that bilateral transaction costs may be acceptable only for a very restricted
number of crops, e.g. industrial crops, medicinal crops and ornamentals.
If transactions costs are prohibitively high there are two likely resulting effects:
· Exchanges will be restricted as those who might otherwise seek germplasm
from foreign sources look for alternative options. Ten Kate and Laird (1999)
provide examples based on personal communications of how increased
transaction costs caused by bureaucratic complications relating to benefit-
sharing arrangements are already discouraging some potential users of
germplasm from accessing sources in the South. It is worth emphasising that
the cited reluctance to negotiate terms of access and benefit sharing arises
from concern about the time and costs of doing so, more than about actual
benefit sharing terms.  This possibility seems to be supported by a recent
press report (O’Connor, Health, Washington D.C., July 2000) stating that
even bioprospecting for pharmaceutical purposes under bilateral
arrangements has lost a lot of its previous impetus, due to the costs and the
negotiating process being prohibitively expensive.
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· To reduce overall costs to acceptable levels, activities such as those
necessary to track the use of germplasm will be reduced, or benefit-sharing
terms agreed to in agreements will be cut back.
Because of total additional costs involved, the exclusion of  more plant genetic
resources from the MLS will not automatically lead to a proportionate increase in
benefits to the germplasm providers. There will be less capturing of benefits than
envisaged by those who propose to profit from a bilateral approach.
We also wish to point out that the distribution of gains and losses under bilateral
arrangements will probably be quite skewed from a global perspective. A very
limited number of source countries might indeed benefit, but at the cost of losses
in terms of access to germplasm, improved breeding materials and technology by
many more developing and developed countries with limited genetic resources,
funds, or existing capacity to use germplasm in national breeding programmes. A
considerable number of countries which have limited plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture and no breeding products to provide would probably not
engage in bilateral agreements, and thus miss the benefits arising from
germplasm exchange. These other costs (lack of benefits) are even more difficult
to measure and to express in figures, but would certainly have an even greater
impact than the transaction costs that form the subject of this study.
While transaction costs are the focus of the discussion here, it is widely assumed
that they are only one component of a wider set of opportunity costs involved.
Yet another aspect that is not covered by our conclusions on prohibitively high
and uneven distribution of transaction costs, and the benefits of bilateral
exchange arrangements relates to the uneven distribution of negotiating power
and capacity between many demanders of PGRFA including private sector
breeders (whether located in the North or the South) and northern public sector
institutions, and many of the South-based suppliers. Also on this grounds it can
be questioned whether envisaged benefits will be realised.
Finally, we would like to emphasise again that both parties developing an
agreement to exchange germplasm would incur transaction costs. Such
agreements would not generate new benefits but potentially redistribute existing
benefits. The central question is whether a MLS with wide coverage can not offer
a better mechanism to redistribute the existing benefits in an equitable way
against less costs.
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Table 1: Overview of germplasm flow for selected crops
Crop Genebank Number of
distributed
accessions
1
Number of
source
countries of
material2
Number of
destination
countries
User types
(%)
User geography
(%)
CGIAR
centers
NARS
Universities
Genebanks
NGOs Private
sector
Others OECD non-OECD
Wheat SINGER 22,601 65 39 25 75
Wheat CGN 3,187 89 23 3 27 3 66 1 95 5
Wheat NGB 1,881 6 35 1 35 0 64 0
Wheat USDA 62,851 31 58
Wheat NIAR 17,186 72 55 0 96 0 0 4
Barley SINGER 26,845 83 34 38 62
Barley CGN 1,603 69 18 95 5
Barley NGB 3,352 8 39 1 25 0 74 0
Barley NIAR 9,507 57 64 5 86 0 0 9
Pearl Millet SINGER 103 17 25 32 51 1 0 16 5 95
Rice SINGER 154,563 108 106 57 41 <1 <1 1 11 89
Rice NIAR 21,453 77 31 6 76 0 0 18
Sorghum SINGER 49,482 82 98 15 75 <1 5 5 15 85
Phaseolus SINGER 22,270 88 74 20 80
Phaseolus NGB 70 4 11 0 31 0 69 0
Chick pea SINGER 56,039 59 92 47 42 <1 <1 10 4 96
Cowpea SINGER 406 29 30 27 69 55 45
Groundnut SINGER 29,774 88 96 56 40 <1 <1 4 1 99
Pigeon pea SINGER 22,517 70 107 58 38 <1 1 3 2 98
Banana SINGER 1,881 7 54 39 61
Potato SINGER 3,964 16 103 8 82 1 2 7 21 79
Potato CGN 917 11 12 0 66 0 26 8 93 7
Sweet
potato
SINGER 139 17 9 4 80 0 0 16 6 94
Sweet
potato
NIAR 936 28 7 0 53 0 0 47
Brassicas CGN 4,164 53 28 0 57 3 36 4 92 8
Lettuce CGN 10,824 59 24 0 62 1 37 0 93 7
Lettuce NGB 35 2 6 0 51 0 49 0
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Crop Genebank Number of
distributed
accessions
1
Number of
source
countries of
material2
Number of
destination
countries
User types
(%)
User geography
(%)
CGIAR
centers
NARS
Universities
Genebanks
NGOs Private
sector
Others OECD non-OECD
Pepper CGN 345 103 10 0 50 0 43 7 77 23
Tomato CGN 375 62 14 0 69 0 30 1 65 35
Tomato NIAR 1,269 49 21 0 95 0 0 5
Tomato NGB 13 1 6 0 8 0 92 0
Grasses SINGER 460,310 154 97 36 58 <1 3 3 15 85
Grasses NGB 2,132 7 26 0 21 0 79 0
Grasses NIAR 3,093 >37 >11 0 100 0 0 0
Total 933,236
Notes
1. Figures from SINGER cover from 1990 onwards; those from CGN, from 1985; those from the Nordic Gene Bank, from 1975; those from USDA-ARS (GRIN) from 1990 on foreign
exchange only; those from NIAR, Japan from 1986, foreign exchange only.
2. Source countries refers to sources of all accessions for each crop in the collections of genebanks, not necessarily just to the distributed accessions, exceept fro USDA-ARS where
figures on source countries only cover incoming germplasm since 1990; the number of source countries is thus a maximum number of sources, except in the case of the USA.
